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Abstract—Eclipse, an open source software project, acknowl-
edges its donors by presenting donation badges in its issue
tracking system Bugzilla. However, the rewarding effect of this
strategy is currently unknown. We applied a framework of
causal inference to investigate relative promptness of developer
response to bug reports with donation badges compared with bug
reports without the badges, and estimated that donation badges
decreases developer response time by a median time of about
two hours. The appearance of donation badges is appealing for
both donors and organizers because of its practical, rewarding
and yet inexpensive effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
Donations play an important role in open source software
(OSS) projects. LibreOffice, an OSS project, reported in 2016
that they had received 200,000 donations in three years, and
emphasized that a large open source software project does not
need a single large corporate sponsor, so long as it can rely
on a large and diverse ecosystem of OSS community [1]. This
makes the management of effective donation programs all the
more important to maintain sustainable OSS projects.
Despite the criticality of donations in OSS, very few studies
have been undertaken on monetary donations to OSS projects,
paying much less attention on their effect. The factors that
impact donations were investigated with public records of
SourceForge, with a result that a decision to donate was influ-
enced by relational commitment with the OSS platform [2].
Another study identified the composition of the donor groups
and the committer group, although small in number, commit-
ters donated more than other of the groups [3].
Eclipse started its donation program Friends of Eclipse in
December 2007. Showing badges started in November 2014
on the Bugzilla issue tracking system [4]. Currently, donors
who contribute 35 USD or more qualify for the Friend of
Eclipse status for one year, and are recognized on Bugzilla
issue tracking system of a friend of Eclipse badge (hereafter
called donation badges).
However, little is known about the impacts of donation
badges. In particular, how badges might benefit the donors.
Based on the framework for causal inference [5], we study how
promptly developers respond to bug reports that have donation
badges compared with bug reports without donation badges.
The analysis revealed that the donation badges decreased
response time by about two hours in median. Our findings
suggest that the appearance of donation badges has a practical
rewarding effect for individual donors. We theorize that this
behavior can be explained as an effective and inexpensive
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Fig. 1. Example of causal inference framework using a DID model (response
time vs. before and after donation badge introduction)
signaling system, where developers use technical and social
information as signals to evaluate potential contributions [6].
We believe that other OSS organizers are able to adopt this
strategy to manage their developer ecosystems.
II. CAUSAL INFERENCE IN BRIEF
Causal inference stems from social science that explores
cause and effects as its main concern [7]. In Econometrics
differences-in-differences methods are one of key analytical
elements for causal inference [7]. We adopted this element
in our analysis, as outlined the figure below. Differences in
differences (DID) statistically visualizes actual and counter-
factual scenarios, thereby enabling a causality analysis. For the
inquiry of the effects of a treatment in statistics, one cannot
see both results with and without a treatment based on one
individual only. DID addresses this problem by comparing two
groups, one with a treatment and one without it.
Figure 1 shows how DID is used to understand the effect
of donation badges. We illustrate the response times of two
groups at the period of before and after the donation badge
program was introduced. Donors refer to all contributors that
received badges. As shown in the figure, the counterfactual
response trend (i.e., dotted line) is coefficient to the response
trend in the control group. Using that counterfactual response
trend and response trend in donors (i.e., positive and negative
coefficient values), we infer the effect of donation badges. For
instance, a negative coefficient value indicates a faster response
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time while a slower response time is indicated by a positive
coefficient value.
To improve our results, the DID is extended to quantile
differences in differences (QDID), to describe better the rela-
tionships at median and other quantiles (only median is studied
in this paper because of the space limitation). Although half
of the reports got responses in one day, the average time is
almost two months because of some outliers (i.e., the max
value is more than four years).
Since DID depends on the common trends assumption [7],
selecting a proper control group is necessary. Matching is a
statistical technique, for every member of donors, to find a
control member with similar observable characteristics, and
is used to reduce selection bias by equating groups. We
use propensity score matching as it is a popular matching
technique.
III. APPROACH
Our analysis is composed of two phases as shown in
Figure 2. First, we select two groups of reporters, that is, a
donors and a control group whose members have not donated
(upper side), then two groups of bug reports in two time
periods are identified, which are submitted by reporters in
the above two reporter groups (lower side). We designed the
analysis with the two phases instead of simply preparing two
groups of bug reports (with and without donor badges) because
the latter can cause a bias in selecting bug reports from specific
reporters.
Step 1: Bug report collection. From the discussion of
proposing donation badges [4], we speculate that November
13, 2014 can be identified as the date of initially implementing
donation badges. So we first identify reporters who had
submitted at least once in both periods, that is, two years
earlier and later than the donation badge implementation. We
then collected bug reports submitted by the above reporters
in a period between the date two years earlier and two
years later than the implementation. Then, we removed bug
reports whose first response comments were made by the same
reporters or bug reports that were assigned to the original
reporters. Bug reports whose first responses had not come
in three days were removed. This is to exclude forgotten or
intentionally postponed (weeks to years for the first responses)
bug reports. Furthermore, we analyze the impact at the hourly
unit, by focusing on relatively promptly responded reports.
Consequently, we are left with 60% of reports after the
removal.
Step 2: Bug reporter metrics. Metrics of bug reporters are
used in the propensity score matching (step 5). The number
of months worked in Bugzilla, the number of bug report
submissions in the periods of before and after implementation,
and the number of commits worked in Git repositories, are
measured for all reporters.
Step 3: Bug report metrics. Metrics of bug reports
(shown in Table I) are used in QDID (step 7). In addition
to essential variables for DID (donor, period, and badge),
possible factors, which affect developer response time (in
hours), were explored. Several categorical variables were
considered: severity metrics of seven severity levels (trivial
to blocker and enhancement) and metrics related to operating
systems. It is reported that bugs with higher severity were
fixed faster [8], and operating systems where bugs were found
were reported to influence bug fixing time [9]. Component
metric measures the median of response time in component.
We found in our pilot study, that developer response times
vary with different components. Community metric represents
the size of contributors in community of the component. Time
metric is a numerical order of time in months, which was
used in [10]. We prepared this metric to consider the impact
of time. Relationship metric mean to consider social and
personal relationships between reporters and responders. Ortu
et al. found that emotional comments could influence fixing
time [11]. However, we did not add emotional factors because
it is reported that existing sentiment analysis tools are not
always applicable to software engineering domains [12]. From
the above metrics, we select a subset of metrics based on the
Akaike information criterion (AIC). Table I shows such subset
that derived the minimum AIC value. For a response variable,
response time was also measured as a hour interval between
the moment a bug is reported and when it gets its first response
comment.
Step 4: Classifying donors or not. Names, the date of
donations, and the amount of donations are summarized in a
donor list. From the above information, we can identify the
periods of donation badge appearance in bug reports for each
donor. When duplicate names but different email addresses
appear in bug reports, we removed them because we could not
associate reporters and donor names uniquely. Consequently,
31 donors were identified.
Step 5: Propensity Score Matching. We used the well-
known nearest neighbor matching algorithm in propensity
score matching. From 957 reporters who had not donated,
31 reporters matched with the 31 donors are identified as a
control group.
Step 6: Filtering Bug Reports. Bug reports submitted by
31 donors or 31 members in a control group are used in QDID.
As shown in Figure 2, those bug reports are labeled with two
time periods and two groups.
Step 7: Quantile Difference in Differences. Using the
collected bug report metrics shown in Table I, QDID is
performed. We report its results of 5th decile.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table I shows coefficient values with p-values at 5th decile
(median). Only the Badge metric has a statistically significant
positive effect (i.e.,negative coefficient) on developer response
time. Its coefficient value indicating the estimated donation
badge effect is about minus two hours. Note that the effect
size is relatively small (Pseudo R2 = 0.011). Since donation
badges have been introduced only a few years ago, further
analysis with longer histories is important.
From the results, readers can infer three findings from Table
I. (1) the response time is faster after contributors gained a
Fig. 2. An overview of the analysis for data collection and causal inference.
TABLE I
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND THEIR EFFECTS IN 5TH DECILE (QUANTILE)
Metric Description Coeffs (Errors) t value Pr (>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.237 (1.120) 1.998 0.046
Donor Reporter is a donor or not 2.259 (0.834) 2.708 0.007
Period Submitted time is before or after the badge introduction -1.598 (1.227) -1.302 0.193
Badge It has a donation badge or not -2.219 (1.061) -2.092 0.037
Enhancement Severity is enhancement or not 0.668 (0.815) 0.820 0.412
Windows Issue is related to Windows or not 1.119 (0.692) 1.617 0.106
Linux Issue is related to Linux or not 0.675 (0.949) 0.711 0.477
MacOS Issue is related to MacOS or not 0.793 (0.907) 0.875 0.382
Component Response days in median for the belonging components 0.317 (0.198) 1.603 0.109
Community # of contributors in the belonging components 0.000 (0.001) 0.105 0.917
Time A numerical order of time in months 0.152 (0.117) 1.303 0.193
Relationship # of reports in which the reporter and the first responder have worked together 0.005 (0.005) 0.894 0.371
AIC = 4025, Pseudo R2 = 0.011
donation badge. This is evident by the negative coefficient
of the Badge metrics as shown in the table. Furthermore,
(2) badges did not have negative effects: all responses to
both donors and contributors became faster after badges were
introduced. This is evident by the negative coefficient of the
Period metrics. Finally, (3) the control group is not unfairly
selected: donors had longer response times compared to the
control group. This is evident by the positive coefficient of the
Donor metrics.
Why do donation badges cause faster response times? We
assume that a donation badge works as a signal, which is a per-
ceivable indicator of hidden technical and social qualities [6].
In detail, donors are likely to contribute long-term instead
of being one-time contributions, Furthermore, they are more
receptive and willing to help communities. Thus, responders
may infer and react to these qualities.
Considering the median of developer response time in 1,822
studied bug reports is 3.5 hours, decreasing time by two hours
is not trivial. This could be a practical rewarding effect for
individual donors. For the organizers managing a developer
ecosystem, donation badges has appeal because of the potential
benefits at an inexpensive cost. Since there is no project-
specific metric nor assumption, we believe that our findings
are not only limited to the current Eclipse project.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying a framework of causal inference from Econo-
metrics, we investigated the causal effect of donation badges
on Bugzilla, one of benefits for donors. We estimated that
donation badges decrease developer response time for bug
reports by about two hours in median. Our findings show
the appearance of donation badges is appealing for both
contributors and organizers. Other OSS organizers are able
to adopt this strategy to manage their developer ecosystems.
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